US Dependence and UN General Assembly Voting on Ukraine, 2022–2026: A Probit Analysis of the Trump Pivot

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Abstract

This paper extends the framework of Farzanegan and Gholipour (2023), who showed that material dependence on Russia predicted non-condemnation of Russia in the 2022 UNGA vote on Ukraine. The February 2025 vote inverts the configuration: the United States broke with the international majority and voted against a resolution supporting Ukraine, providing the first opportunity to test whether US-dependence predicts voting with the US when the US itself takes a consequential position. Using a probit regression on the 113 countries that supported Ukraine in 2022, we find that pre-pivot US aid dependence predicts defection in 2025 at the 5% level, and that polyarchy predicts against defection at the 1% level. Extending the analysis to the 2026 vote, where the US softened its position to an abstention, we find that the relationship between structural dependencies and voting collapses entirely. Material ties predict voting behaviour only when the patron takes a clear position; democratic institutions consistently resist hegemonic pull in either direction.

1 Introduction

In March 2022, 141 UN member states voted to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The near-unanimity was widely interpreted as a principled stand for sovereignty and international law. Countries that voted against the resolution or abstained were scrutinised for their material ties to Moscow (Russian arms imports, defence cooperation agreements, aid dependence). The implication was that non-support reflected interest, while support reflected principle. But this raises a question: if material dependence on Russia explains voting with Russia, it is at least plausible that material dependence on the United States explains voting with the United States. In 2022, there was no way to separate principled commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty from conformism with the hegemon.

The literature has long favoured a sort of materialist/realpolitik answer, where nations for the most part act in a way that favours their direct national interests or their hegemon's interests. Bilateral trade, foreign aid, and security ties are better predictors of how countries vote than regime type or stated principles (Dreher and Jensen, 2013; Dreher et al., 2008; Bailey et al., 2017). Farzanegan and Gholipour (2023) confirmed this for the Ukraine case as defence cooperation agreements with Russia, Russian aid receipts, and arms imports all predicted non-condemnation of the 2022 invasion.

The Trump administration's policy reversal in February 2025 broke that alignment. For the first time since the invasion, supporting Ukraine meant opposing the United States. This paper replicates the Farzanegan and Gholipour (2023) specification on the 2025 and 2026 votes and augments it using US-dependence covariates (aid, alliance membership, military basing, arms imports) and testing whether the determinants of non-support reconfigured around patron-dependence when the patron itself changed sides.

Our results suggest they did. Among the 113 states that supported Ukraine in 2022, the strongest predictor of defection in 2025 is US aid ($p = 0.036$). Democratic governance insulates against switching ($p = 0.001$). The US-dependence variables that matter in 2025 have no predictive power in 2022, confirming that these ties only become salient when the patron's

signal changes direction. Moreover, when the US softened its position to an abstention in 2026, the model's explanatory power collapsed, with Pseudo R^2 falling from 0.34 to 0.06. Democracies that had defected came back while aid-dependent non-democracies did not.

Section 2 describes the data and estimation strategy. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 discusses implications and limitations. Section 5 concludes.

2 Data and Method

2.1 Dependent Variables

We analyse three UN General Assembly votes on the Russia–Ukraine war, each coded as a binary: non-support = 1 (voted against, abstained, or absent), support = 0 (voted in favour of the resolution condemning Russia or calling for withdrawal).

Table 1: UNGA votes on the Russia–Ukraine war

Vote	Resolution	Date	Result	US position
2022	A/RES/ES-11/1	2 March 2022	141–5–35	**Yes**
2025	A/ES-11/L.10	24 February 2025	93–18–65	**No**
2026	A/ES-11/L.17	24 February 2026	107–12–51	**Abstain**

Note: Non-support coded as voted against, abstained, or absent.

The United States voted in favor of Ukraine in 2022, against in 2025, and abstained from the most recent vote in 2026. This variation in the hegemon's position across three votes on the same underlying conflict, with the same structural dependencies, provides our identification strategy. In the context of a resolution condemning an act of aggression supported by the overwhelming majority of states, abstention represents a deliberate refusal to condemn, not a neutral position. We follow Farzanegan and Gholipour (2023) in coding abstention and absence as non-support.

Two additional dependent variables are constructed for the mechanism analysis. *Switched* is coded 1 for countries that supported the resolution in 2022 but did not support it in 2025

($N = 36$ in the analysis sample). *Returned* is coded 1 for countries that did not support in 2025 but supported in 2026 ($N = 47$).

Source: the 2022 vote is drawn from the Voeten UN General Assembly Voting Dataset (Voeten, 2023). The 2025 and 2026 votes are hand-coded from roll-call records at the UN Digital Library.

2.2 Independent Variables

Table 2 summarises all independent variables, their definitions, and sources. We organise them into four blocks: Russia-side, US-side, China-side, and controls.

Table 2: Independent variables

Variable	Description	Source
Russia-side (6)		
russia_import_share	Bilateral imports from Russia / total imports, avg. 2015–2021	IMF DOTS
russia_aid_orbit	Dummy: CSTO member or Russian aid recipient, 2015–2021	CSTO; AidData
russia_dca	Dummy: defence cooperation agreement with Russia	Kinne (2020)
russia_arms_share	Russia share of arms imports (TIV), avg. 2015–2021	SIPRI
former_ussr	Dummy: former Soviet republic (excl. Russia)	—
russia_land_border	Dummy: shares land border with Russia	—
US-side (4)		
log_us_aid	Ln(US bilateral aid), avg. 2015–2021	USAID Greenbook
us_alliance	Dummy: NATO, ANZUS, Rio Treaty, bilateral, or MNNA	ATOP; State Dept.
us_base_host	Dummy: hosts $\geq$500 US military personnel	Vine; DoD
us_arms_share	US share of arms imports (TIV), avg. 2015–2021	SIPRI
China-side (2)		
china_import_share	Bilateral imports from China / total imports, avg. 2015–2021	IMF DOTS
bri	Dummy: signed BRI memorandum of understanding	GFDC
Controls (2)		
log_gdp_per_capita	Ln(GDP per capita, current USD, 2021)	World Bank WDI
polyarchy	V-Dem polyarchy index (0–1), 2021	V-Dem v16

Note: All trade, arms, and aid variables use 2015–2021 averages to avoid sanctions-induced endogeneity. CFA states (Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau) excluded from regression due to perfect separation. GFDC = Green Finance & Development Center.

Russia-side variables. These replicate the core of Farzanegan and Gholipour (2023). Trade dependence on Russia is measured as the bilateral import share from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. Defence ties are captured through a dummy for defence cooperation agreements (from the Kinne dataset) and Russia's share of the country's arms imports (from SIPRI). We also include a dummy for membership of the Russia aid orbit, coded 1 if the country is a CSTO member or a documented recipient of Russian bilateral aid between 2015 and 2021, drawing on AidData's Russian Foreign Aid dataset. We include two historical and geographical controls (former USSR membership and shared land border with Russia) which capture path-dependent identity ties and geographic coercion. Note that Farzanegan and Gholipour (2023) used continuous measures for Russian aid and defence cooperation; our dummy specifications are coarser, which contributes to imprecise individual coefficient estimates while preserving the block's overall explanatory power.

US-side variables. This constitutes the paper's main contribution. The theoretical logic mirrors the Russia-side block: if material dependence on Russia predicts alignment with Russia then material dependence on the United States should predict alignment with the US when their position diverges from the resolution. US aid is measured as the natural log of total bilateral aid received (from the USAID Greenbook). Formal security ties are captured through a dummy for US alliance membership, encompassing NATO, ANZUS, the Rio Treaty, bilateral defence treaties, and Major Non-NATO Ally designations. Physical military presence is measured by a dummy for hosting at least 500 US military personnel in permanent deployment, drawing on David Vine's base inventory cross-referenced with DoD quarterly personnel reports. Military equipment dependence is measured as the US share of the country's total arms imports from SIPRI.

The Compact of Free Association states (Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau) represent the most extreme form of US dependence but are excluded from the regression due to perfect separation as all three defected in 2025. They are discussed descriptively in the results.

China-side variables. We include two China-side variables to control for a potential omitted variable, as several states' abstention on Ukraine may reflect Chinese economic pressure rather than US or Russian ties. China import share captures trade dependence, while a dummy for BRI membership captures formalised economic and political alignment.

Controls. Log GDP per capita controls for development level, as wealthier countries may be less susceptible to patron pressure and more embedded in Western institutions. The V-Dem polyarchy index controls for regime type; democracies may face domestic audience costs for abandoning stated principles, making them less responsive to the hegemon's signal.

2.3 Estimation

We estimate probit regressions following Farzanegan and Gholipour (2023). The dependent variable is binary (non-support = 1, support = 0); the probit model estimates the probability of non-support as a function of the standard normal cumulative distribution function applied to a linear combination of covariates:

$$\Pr(\text{non-support}_i = 1) = \Phi(\mathbf{x}_i'\boldsymbol{\beta}) \tag{1}$$

where $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the standard normal CDF and $\mathbf{x}_i$ is the vector of covariates for country i. Marginal effects are computed at the mean of all covariates and reported throughout; these represent the change in probability of non-support for a unit change in the variable (or a $0 \rightarrow 1$ change for dummies).

The analysis proceeds in three stages. We first document the realignment descriptively by comparing the countries that switched from support in 2022 to non-support in 2025 against those that remained loyal to Ukraine across both votes. We restrict the comparison to the 113 countries which are at risk of switching (i.e. who voted in support of Ukraine in 2022) in order to avoid contaminating the sample with countries that were already non-supportive before the US pivot. Secondly, we run a probit regression on that same at-risk sample to

test whether US-dependence variables statistically predict switching once Russia-side, China-side, and income controls are added. Thirdly, we extend the full probit specification to all three votes (2022, 2025, 2026) in order to document how the relationship between structural dependencies and voting behaviour varies based on the US's position. We keep the sample of countries and the structural dependencies constant across the three votes which allows us to verify whether the variation in coefficients are attributable to the variation in the hegemon's position. We provide a set of supporting analyses which are reported in the appendix and trace the step-by-step construction of the specification of the Farzanegan and Gholipour (2023) baseline, report the switcher probit regression with separated variables retained and perfect-separation cases. The sample comprises 159 countries with complete data on all covariates, the standard errors are computed from the inverse of the observed information matrix which is the default for maximum-likelihood probit estimations. Perfect or quasi-perfect separation, which is a covariate that perfectly or near-perfectly predicts the outcome within the estimation sample and flagged in the output by standard errors exceeding 1,000, is noted in the tables and the affected variables are dropped from the reported specifications.

3 Results

3.1 Who switched

In 2025, 36 (31.9%) of the 113 countries who had previously voted in favour of Ukraine switched their vote in concordance with the United States, we first compare the means for the various independent variables between the switchers and non-switchers in Table 3:

We can observe that the biggest differences are in US aid, polyarchy and GDP per capita, which suggest that defectors were generally more aided by the US between 2015 and 2021, were less democratic and poorer on average. The Russia side variables are less interpretable here, given that countries with strong Russia ties, which would have been reflected in aid orbit and DCA, were already unsupportive in 2022 and are therefore not included in our "at

Table 3: Switcher profile: within the at-risk sample

Variable	Switchers ($N = 36$)	Loyal ($N = 77$)	Diff.	t	p
Russia-side					
russia_import_share	0.014	0.021	−0.007	−1.65	0.101
russia_aid_orbit	0.000	0.039	−0.039	−1.76	0.083*
russia_dca	0.000	0.052	−0.052	−2.04	0.045**
russia_arms_share	0.052	0.030	+0.022	+0.74	0.461
former_ussr	0.028	0.052	−0.024	−0.64	0.523
russia_land_border	0.028	0.065	−0.037	−0.94	0.351
US-side					
log_us_aid	20.659	18.310	+2.349	+4.08	0.000***
us_alliance	0.278	0.468	−0.190	−2.00	0.049**
us_base_host	0.111	0.221	−0.110	−1.54	0.128
us_arms_share	0.299	0.265	+0.034	+0.51	0.613
China-side and controls					
china_import_share	0.144	0.121	+0.023	+1.72	0.090*
bri	0.861	0.766	+0.095	+1.25	0.215
log_gdp_per_capita	8.539	9.368	−0.829	−2.95	0.004***
polyarchy	0.450	0.651	−0.200	−4.38	0.000***

Notes: Comparison of means within the 113 countries that supported Ukraine in 2022 (the at-risk sample). Switchers defected in 2025; loyal supporters supported in both votes. t-statistics from Welch's two-sample test with unequal variances; p-values for two-sided alternative. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

risk" sample; these are therefore low by construction.

A particularly clear illustration lies in the three Compact of Free Association states: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau. These are the countries who are most dependent on the United States in the whole international system (their defence is provided by the US military, their citizens can live and work in the US under the Compact, and a substantial share of their government revenues comes from US federal programmes). All three defected in 2025. We drop them from the regressions due to perfect separation (all three are non-support cases with extreme values on every US-dependence measure), but their unanimous switch the moment the US voted No is the purest illustration of the descriptive pattern in the data.

The descriptive pattern raises the question of whether US-dependence statistically predicts switching once controls are added, and how it compares to the Russia-dependence result F&G found for the 2022 vote.

3.2 Does US-dependence predict switching?

Farzanegan and Gholipour (2023) have already established that material dependence on Russia predicted non-condemnation of Russia in 2022, we wish to verify whether the 2025 UNGA vote offers a comparable situation for the US. We restrict the sample to the 113 countries which supported Ukraine in 2022 (who are therefore at risk of switching). We run a probit regression on this at-risk sample using Russia and China dependence variables as well as GDP as controls, the results are reported in Table 4.

We can see that `log_us_aid` ($dy/dx = 0.041$, $p = 0.036$) is significant at 5% level. A one log-unit increase in US aid (which is approximately a 2.7 fold increase in dollar value) is associated with a 4.1% higher probability of switching to non-support. We note that us-aid is based on structural dependencies on the United States as it is built as the average from 2015 to 2021 in order to exempt the disturbances caused by Trump's post-inauguration aid freeze. The other US-side variables (`us_alliance`, `us_base_host`, `us_arms_share`) carry

Table 4: Predicting defection in 2025: probit on the at-risk sample

	Pr(defected in 2025) $N = 113$
Russia-side	
russia_import_share	−3.713
	(2.832)
russia_aid_orbit	—
russia_dca	—
russia_arms_share	−0.092
	(0.322)
former_ussr	0.269
	(0.442)
russia_land_border	−0.013
	(0.371)
US-side	
log_us_aid	0.041**
	(0.020)
us_alliance	−0.084
	(0.099)
us_base_host	−0.070
	(0.136)
us_arms_share	0.213
	(0.135)
China-side	
china_import_share	−0.714
	(0.633)
bri	−0.083
	(0.117)
Controls	
log_gdp_per_capita	0.007
	(0.047)
polyarchy	−0.610***
	(0.184)
N	113
Pseudo R^2	0.219
Log-likelihood	−55.2

Notes: Probit marginal effects ($\mathrm{d}y/\mathrm{d}x$) at the mean, with standard errors in parentheses. The sample is restricted to the 113 countries that supported Ukraine in the 2022 vote (the at-risk sample); the dependent variable equals 1 if the country did not support the 2025 resolution. `russia_aid_orbit` and `russia_dca` are dropped due to perfect separation: no country with either characteristic was in the at-risk sample, because states tied to Russia through aid or formal defence cooperation were already non-supportive in 2022. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

the expected signs but are not significant at a 10% level, we suspect this is due to high multicollinearity between the variables (pairwise correlations of 0.46–0.47) which means that individual coefficients are imprecise even when the block as a whole is predictive.

This result is a direct parallel to F&G's results: material dependence on the hegemon predicts voting in the same direction.

However the strongest result from this regression is polyarchy ($dy/dx = -0.610$, $p = 0.001$), which is significant at the 1% level. This indicates that moving from the 25% to the 75% percentile of democracy, reduces the probability of switching by about 20 percentage points. Democratic institutions safeguard against switching even when dependence on the patron is controlled for.

The nulls on the Russia side are to be expected as most countries who depend on Russia materially voted non-support in 2022 and are therefore not included in the sample, we kept the variables as a control.

3.3 The three-vote specification

We now run a three-vote specification in Table 5 to document how the relationship varies with the US's position across 2022, 2025, and 2026:

In the full 159-country sample, US arms share is the strongest individual US-side predictor of non-support ($dy/dx = 0.195$, $p = 0.102$). A likelihood ratio test on the US-dependence block is jointly significant at 10% ($LR = 8.70$, $p = 0.069$); see Appendix B for the stepwise construction. The full-sample result is weaker than the at-risk result because it pools countries that were already non-supportive in 2022 (whose behaviour in 2025 adds little information about what impacts countries' voting patterns) with those actually at risk of switching.

However the table is informative as it shows that in 2026 when the US's signal was mixed (Abstention) the explanatory power of the variables collapsed (from 0.339 to 0.055) and every US-dependence variable returns to near-zero values (log US aid $p = 0.996$, US arms share

Table 5: Main results: full specification on the 2022, 2025, and 2026 votes

	2022 (US: Yes)	2025 (US: No)	2026 (US: Abstain)
Russia-side			
russia_import_share	1.726	0.396	−2.119
	(1.420)	(1.183)	(1.308)
russia_aid_orbit	0.006	0.043	0.357*
	(0.115)	(0.154)	(0.201)
russia_dca	0.098	−0.213	−0.070
	(0.116)	(0.171)	(0.212)
russia_arms_share	0.154	0.395	0.067
	(0.155)	(0.263)	(0.274)
former_ussr	−0.034	0.033	0.177
	(0.247)	(0.232)	(0.296)
russia_land_border	−0.046	−0.016	−0.100
	(0.228)	(0.211)	(0.230)
US-side			
log_us_aid	0.003	0.023	0.000
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.018)
us_alliance	−0.174*	−0.122	0.096
	(0.096)	(0.085)	(0.110)
us_base_host	—	−0.138	−0.131
		(0.121)	(0.136)
us_arms_share	0.009	0.195	0.070
	(0.112)	(0.119)	(0.150)
China-side			
china_import_share	−0.025	−0.204	−0.447
	(0.430)	(0.483)	(0.622)
bri	0.043	−0.114	0.033
	(0.124)	(0.099)	(0.120)
Controls			
log_gdp_per_capita	−0.076**	−0.045	0.049
	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.047)
polyarchy	−0.299**	−0.638***	−0.182
	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.210)
N	159	159	159
Pseudo R^2	0.423	0.339	0.055
Log-likelihood	−55.2	−72.8	−103.7

Notes: Probit marginal effects ($\mathrm{d}y/\mathrm{d}x$) at the mean, with standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. The 2022 specification drops `us_base_host` due to perfect separation (no base host voted against Ukraine in 2022). A likelihood ratio test of the US-side block comparing the Russia-only specification to the Russia-plus-US specification on the 2025 vote yields $LR = 8.70$ ($\mathrm{df} = 4$, $p = 0.069$); detail in Appendix B.

$p = 0.640$).

We can infer that an F&G-style pattern where the hegemon impacts voting only materialises when their vote is clear, a mixed signal such as an abstention doesn't seem to direct any dependent country's vote (Appendix G).

When tracking polyarchy across the 3 dates we can observe this paper's most consistent empirical pattern: the marginal effects are:

- -0.30 in 2022 ($p = 0.046$)
- -0.64 in 2025 ($p < 0.001$)
- -0.18 in 2026 ($p = 0.386$)

In 2022, non-support meant joining the minority which had declined to condemn Russia's illegal invasion. We can see that democracies were less likely to do this. In 2025, non-support meant voting with the US against the international majority. Democracies were again less likely, and the effect more than doubled. We can infer that regardless of which hegemon was pulling and regardless of the direction of the pull, democratic regimes held closer to the pro-Ukraine position than non-democratic ones.

The effect disappears in 2026 when the US's abstention makes the direction of pressure ambiguous as there is nothing directional to resist.

4 Discussion

We established that US aid dependence predicted voting against Ukraine in 2025 when the US changed sides, which serves as a direct extension to Farzanegan and Gholipour (2023). We find that the more democratic a state is the less they are likely to be influenced. When the signal weakens in 2026 the relationship between dependence and voting behaviour collapses, we deduce that the Farzanegan and Gholipour pattern requires a clear patron position (dependent countries will not abstain just because the US abstained).

The materialist literature (Dreher and Jensen, 2013; Bailey et al., 2017) treats material ties as stable predictors of UN voting alignment. However our 2026 result complicates this: when the US signals ambiguously, the same structural dependencies produce no systematic behaviour. Material ties matter, but they are conditioned on clear signals from the patron.

Our paper has several limitations. Firstly the US-dependence is strongest at 5% in the at-risk specification and weaker (10% joint) in the full sample. A more decisive test would require additional cross-hegemon pivots. The three-vote structure identifies variation from a single US pivot. We cannot separate "the US changed its position" from broader signals from the Trump administration such as rhetoric, aid threats and alliance signalling. Future work could exploit cross-issue variation within the same administration to isolate the vote-specific effect.

Another limitation is that we use a binary non-support coding which pools abstentions and No votes (Farzanegan and Gholipour methodology). This allows for less granularity which we address in a multinomial robustness check (Appendix G) that confirms that the 2026 collapse is not an artifact, but this is limited to a very small sub-sample (Oppose category has $n = 12$).

Furthermore we use dummies for certain Russian variables when Farzanegan and Gholipour (2023) used continuous variables, this was done in order to simplify the data-collection process and was motivated by the fact that a perfect replication of their 2022 results was not necessary to our methodology, however this impacts some coefficients and makes them less precise, although the direction doesn't change materially.

Overall, our findings align with current materialist literature which suggests a realpolitik view of the world where countries align with their material interests rather than on the common framework of international law. The one finding that consistently resists this reading is democracy. Democratic governments are accountable to their citizens, and that accountability might be what prevents them from following the hegemon when the hegemon's position turns out to be indefensible. When the US voted with the international majority in 2022,

democracies voted with it. When the US voted against the majority in 2025, democracies did not follow. The same mechanism produces different behaviour depending on whether the patron's position is defensible to a domestic public. Democracies are not necessarily more principled than other states, but the institutions they have built make it harder for them to pull away from their principles when there is something to gain from it.

Further research could attempt to extend this study onto a larger range of UNGA votes in order to verify whether our findings are not restricted to this case study of Ukraine. One natural test would be to replicate the three-vote design on other resolutions where the US has taken contested positions against the international majority (Israel–Palestine votes being the obvious candidate, where the US routinely votes against large majorities). Moreover, our data stops at the vote itself as we do not observe whether countries that opposed the US faced concrete consequences in the months following the 2025 pivot. Linking the vote to subsequent material flows would allow future work to test whether the patron-signalling we observe here reflects anticipated consequences or actual ones.

Understanding why countries break from the principles they have committed to is the first step in protecting those principles.

5 Conclusion

Two years after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the near-universal condemnation of 2022 has fractured. This paper has shown that the fracture is not random. The countries that moved were disproportionately those with structural aid ties to the United States and weaker democratic institutions, while the countries that held firm were those embedded in accountable political systems. When the US signalled clearly, dependent states followed; when the signal became ambiguous, the mechanism went quiet. The same countries, facing the same material dependencies, produced different behaviours depending on what their patron asked of them and whether their domestic institutions made compliance costly.

The materialist reading of UN voting predicts that dependent states follow their patrons. We find that dependence binds only conditionally and that democracy diminishes the binding. This is a narrow empirical finding on one set of votes, but its implication runs wider: the most durable international commitments are the ones held by states whose governments cannot change positions without being held accountable by their citizens and institutional structures. Whatever future hegemonic realignments may bring, the UNGA record on Ukraine suggests that democratic institutions remain the most reliable ground for principled international behaviour.

Appendix

A. Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Descriptive statistics, analysis sample ($N = 159$)

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Russia-side					
russia_import_share	159	0.033	0.075	0.000	0.559
russia_aid_orbit	159	0.113	0.318	0	1
russia_dca	159	0.145	0.353	0	1
russia_arms_share	159	0.118	0.254	0.000	1.000
former_ussr	159	0.082	0.275	0	1
russia_land_border	159	0.063	0.244	0	1
US-side					
log_us_aid	159	19.656	3.136	9.258	25.297
us_alliance	159	0.302	0.461	0	1
us_base_host	159	0.132	0.340	0	1
us_arms_share	159	0.224	0.302	0.000	1.000
China-side					
china_import_share	159	0.141	0.074	0.017	0.360
bri	159	0.830	0.377	0	1
Controls					
log_gdp_per_capita	159	8.682	1.443	5.580	11.813
polyarchy	159	0.514	0.252	0.015	0.915
Dependent variables					
non_support_2022	159	0.289	0.455	0	1
non_support_2025	159	0.516	0.501	0	1
non_support_2026	159	0.465	0.500	0	1

B. F&G Replication and the Stepwise US Extension

This appendix shows how the 2025 specification in Table 5 was built. M1 applies the Farzaneh-gan and Gholipour (2023) Russia-only specification to the 2022 vote and fits at Pseudo $R^2 = 0.40$. M2 applies the same specification to the 2025 vote and loses most of that fit (Pseudo $R^2 = 0.29$). M3 adds the four US-side variables and recovers some of it (Pseudo $R^2 = 0.33$).

A likelihood ratio test of M3 against M2 yields LR = 8.70 on 4 degrees of freedom, $p =$

Table A2: F&G replication (M1, M2) and stepwise US extension (M3)

	M1 2022 Russia only	M2 2025 Russia only	M3 2025 Russia + US
russia_import_share	1.089	0.217	0.526
	(1.130)	(1.166)	(1.206)
russia_aid_orbit	0.035	0.011	0.031
	(0.114)	(0.166)	(0.155)
russia_dca	0.079	−0.210	−0.201
	(0.114)	(0.184)	(0.171)
russia_arms_share	0.235	0.494*	0.400
	(0.150)	(0.283)	(0.264)
former_ussr	0.077	0.098	0.022
	(0.201)	(0.228)	(0.232)
russia_land_border	−0.078	−0.048	−0.019
	(0.200)	(0.206)	(0.209)
log_us_aid			0.022
			(0.015)
us_alliance			−0.118
			(0.086)
us_base_host			−0.137
			(0.120)
us_arms_share			0.204*
			(0.121)
log_gdp_per_capita	−0.095***	−0.082***	−0.040
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.038)
polyarchy	−0.266*	−0.591***	−0.589***
	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.146)
N	159	159	159
Pseudo R^2	0.403	0.294	0.333
Log-likelihood	−57.1	−77.8	−73.4

Notes: Probit marginal effects at the mean. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

0.069, which puts the US block at 10% joint significance. Within the block, `us_arms_share` reaches 10% in M3 ($dy/dx = 0.204$, $p = 0.092$); a one standard deviation increase in arms share (0.30) raises the probability of non-support by 6 percentage points. The other US side coefficients are imprecise, which we attribute to multicollinearity within the block (Appendix F). Adding the China side variables shifts Pseudo R^2 only from 0.333 to 0.339 and gives the 2025 column of Table 5.

C. Switcher Model: Perfect-Separation Specification

Table 4 drops `russia_aid_orbit` and `russia_dca` for perfect separation. For completeness the full M6 specification is reported below. It converges, but the two separated coefficients are uninterpretable (standard errors above 10^6). The other coefficients are stable across the two specifications.

D. The Return Model

Model M8 estimates the probability of returning to support in 2026. Of the 36 switchers in the main text, 47 countries in the full sample returned, a broader count because some 2022 non-supporters also shifted toward support once the US abstained.

Only `polyarchy` predicts returning ($dy/dx = -0.390$, $p = 0.019$). No US side variable predicts return and no Russia side variable predicts staying, which contrasts with Table 4 where `log_us_aid` ($p = 0.036$) and `polyarchy` ($p = 0.001$) both drive defection. Two channels pulled countries away in 2025, material dependence and weak institutions, and only the institutional channel released when the signal weakened. Democracies came back. Aid dependent non democracies did not.

E. Perfect Separation Cases

Two cases of perfect separation are excluded from the regressions but are worth reporting.

Table A3: Switcher model with separated variables retained (M6)

Variable	M6
russia_import_share	−2.163
	(2.665)
russia_aid_orbit	−1.110 [SEP]
	(1.47×10^6)
russia_dca	−2.857 [SEP]
	(9.80×10^6)
russia_arms_share	0.185
	(0.404)
former_ussr	0.150
	(0.403)
russia_land_border	0.014
	(0.332)
log_us_aid	0.035*
	(0.019)
us_alliance	−0.064
	(0.095)
us_base_host	−0.126
	(0.130)
us_arms_share	0.167
	(0.128)
china_import_share	−0.188
	(0.656)
bri	−0.079
	(0.111)
log_gdp_per_capita	0.016
	(0.045)
polyarchy	−0.671***
	(0.173)
N	113
Pseudo R^2	0.273
Log-likelihood	−51.4

Notes: Probit marginal effects at the mean. Standard errors in parentheses. [SEP] indicates perfect separation; the coefficient is not interpretable. $^{*}\,p < 0.10$, $^{***}\,p < 0.01$.

Table A4: Return model (M8): Pr(returned to support in 2026)

Variable	M8
russia_import_share	1.339
	(1.059)
russia_aid_orbit	−0.185
	(0.149)
russia_dca	0.029
	(0.156)
russia_arms_share	0.018
	(0.200)
former_ussr	−0.136
	(0.238)
russia_land_border	0.197
	(0.199)
log_us_aid	0.016
	(0.017)
us_alliance	−0.045
	(0.096)
us_base_host	−0.233
	(0.154)
us_arms_share	0.070
	(0.126)
china_import_share	0.248
	(0.508)
bri	−0.103
	(0.109)
log_gdp_per_capita	−0.047
	(0.039)
polyarchy	−0.390**
	(0.166)
N	159
Pseudo R^2	0.212
Log-likelihood	−76.1

Notes: Probit marginal effects at the mean. Standard errors in parentheses.
** $p < 0.05$.

First, all three Compact of Free Association states (Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau) defected in 2025. These are the most US dependent states in the international system: their defence is provided by the US military, their citizens can live and work in the US, and they receive substantial US federal funding. The fact that all three defected the moment the US voted No is the clearest single illustration of the mechanism in the paper.

Second, no US base host voted against Ukraine in 2022. Every base host supported the resolution when the US did. Physical security infrastructure may act as a floor of alignment that holds even when other dependency channels do not. In 2025, base hosts were somewhat less likely to defect (Table 5, $dy/dx = -0.138$, $p = 0.257$), though the effect is not significant.

F. Correlation Matrix

Pairwise correlations among the 14 independent variables show moderate structure within the Russia side and US side blocks. No pair exceeds $|r| = 0.8$. Notable pairs above $|r| = 0.4$: `russia_import_share` / `former_ussr` (0.77), `russia_aid_orbit` / `russia_dca` (0.76), `russia_dca` / `russia_arms_share` (0.72), `log_us_aid` / `log_gdp_per_capita` (-0.71), `log_gdp_per_capita` / `polyarchy` (0.56), `us_alliance` / `us_base_host` (0.47), `us_alliance` / `us_arms_share` (0.46).

The Russia side pairs reflect real overlap in the underlying data, since CSTO members are disproportionately former Soviet republics and Russia border states. This is what drives the imprecise individual coefficients we see on the Russia block. The negative correlation between `log_us_aid` and `log_gdp_per_capita` reflects that poorer countries receive more US aid; we keep both variables in the specification to separate aid dependence from income.

G. Three-Way Outcome on 2026: Multinomial Logit

The binary non-support coding pools abstentions (which mirror the US position in 2026) with outright opposition (No votes and absences). To check whether the 2026 collapse in Table 5 masks a finer effect, we re-estimate the 2026 specification as a multinomial logit with

three outcomes: Support (reference, $n = 85$), Abstain (including absent, $n = 62$), Oppose (No, $n = 12$).

Table A5: Multinomial logit on the 2026 vote (reference: Support)

	Abstain vs. Support	Oppose vs. Support
log_us_aid	−0.018	+0.144
	(0.083)	(0.197)
us_alliance	+0.332	+0.940
	(0.502)	(0.957)
us_base_host	−0.564	−0.731
	(0.632)	(1.333)
us_arms_share	+0.590	−1.526
	(0.666)	(1.588)
russia_aid_orbit	+1.172	+3.553**
	(0.964)	(1.780)
polyarchy	−1.121	+0.828
	(0.962)	(1.985)
N (Support / Abstain / Oppose)	85 / 62 / 12	
Pseudo R^2	0.100	
LLR p-value	0.435	

Notes: Coefficients (not marginal effects); standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Russia side (excluding `russia_aid_orbit`) and China side coefficients omitted; full output on request. The Oppose category has $n = 12$ and several coefficients have standard errors above 10 (quasi-separation); the Oppose equation is reported for completeness but should not be interpreted in isolation.

The multinomial logit confirms the binary result. The full covariate set is not jointly significant (LLR $p = 0.435$), and no US side variable predicts either equation. The only coefficient reaching 5% is `russia_aid_orbit` in the Oppose equation, which is consistent with the weak Russia signal we see in Table 5. A bivariate check among the 2026 non-supporters shows abstainers have slightly higher US arms share than outright opposers (0.27 vs. 0.14, $p = 0.065$), but this does not survive once we add controls. The 2026 collapse is not a coding artifact.

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