India and Pakistan Clash Again, but Likely Won’t Escalate Further

India and Pakistan are once again locked in a familiar cycle of tension, marked by cross-border strikes, sharp rhetoric, and rising public anxiety. Yet despite the heated atmosphere, the conflict is widely expected to remain limited in scope and eventually de-escalate. Behind the scenes, both governments appear more interested in scoring political points at home than pursuing a full-scale war. Their actions, measured military responses and carefully crafted messaging, suggest a strategy aimed at domestic audiences rather than battlefield escalation. In this article, we explore why this crisis, while serious, is unlikely to spiral out of control, and what signals from both sides reveal about their true intentions.
The initial terrorist attack was caused by Pakistan
There are strong suspicions that the group behind the recent deadly attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, identified as the Islamic Resistance Front (IRF), operates with either the support or tacit tolerance of elements within the Pakistani state. These suspicions are not based solely on Indian claims; they reflect a broader consensus among Western intelligence analysts and international observers. The IRF is widely believed to be a front for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistan-based militant group that has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and others. LeT was responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which killed over 170 people, including foreign nationals. U.S. intelligence has consistently identified LeT as maintaining ties with Pakistan’s military and its intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Although Pakistan officially bans LeT and similar groups, analysts from think tanks such as the Council on Foreign Relations and government assessments, such as those from the U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism, have long noted that these organizations often continue to operate under different names. Western intelligence agencies have frequently expressed concern that Pakistan uses such groups to pursue strategic interests in the disputed Kashmir region while maintaining plausible deniability. This aligns with a pattern where militant groups are not necessarily under direct government control but are allowed to function within Pakistan with minimal interference. While there is currently no public, direct evidence linking the Pakistani government to the April 2025 attack, the continued presence and activity of these groups, despite international sanctions and pressure, provides a strong basis for suspicion. In this context, many observers believe Pakistan bears at least indirect responsibility, either by failing to dismantle these networks or by quietly enabling their operations for geopolitical leverage.
The strategy of allowing militant groups to operate unofficially, while maintaining formal deniability, closely mirrors Russia’s use of hybrid warfare tactics, particularly in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states. Just as Russia has employed proxies, mercenaries, and unmarked forces to obscure direct involvement, Pakistan’s apparent tolerance of jihadist groups allows it to exert pressure on India without triggering full-scale retaliation or international condemnation.
Low risk of escalation
Despite the sharp rise in tensions following the recent terrorist attack and subsequent military responses, the likelihood of a full-scale war between India and Pakistan remains low, largely because Pakistan is in no position to sustain one. Economically, Pakistan is facing a severe crisis: inflation is high, its foreign currency reserves are dangerously low, and it remains heavily dependent on international loans, especially from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The country is already struggling to maintain essential public services, and a war would risk total economic collapse. Politically, the government is fragile, grappling with internal unrest, power struggles between civilian leaders and the military, and a deeply divided society. While a limited conflict might be used to stir nationalist unity, escalating into a broader war would be a high-risk move that Pakistan is ill-equipped to handle.
India, on the other hand, is in a stronger position both economically and militarily. Its economy is far larger and more stable, and its military has superior conventional strength, especially in air and naval power. Yet even for India, war is not a cost-free option. Open conflict would disrupt economic growth, deter foreign investment, and damage India’s image as a rising global power. That’s why, in recent years, India has favored limited, targeted strikes against militant infrastructure rather than full-scale military operations. Both nations also possess nuclear weapons, creating a powerful deterrent against all-out war. In this context, experts believe that while skirmishes and proxy violence may continue, neither country is in a position, economically or strategically, where launching a full-scale war would serve its long-term interests.
Actions on both sides suggest limited intentions
Although tensions between India and Pakistan have spiked following the recent attack in Kashmir and India’s retaliatory strikes, the actions of both countries suggest that neither side is truly seeking a full-scale war. So far, both have limited their military responses to drone strikes, cross-border shelling, and long-range attacks on selected targets, without sending troops into each other’s territory. India used kamikaze drones and air-launched weapons without crossing its soldiers over the border, while Pakistan responded in kind with aerial interceptions and artillery fire, not ground invasions. This restraint is a strong signal: when nations want war, they tend to cross red lines with more aggressive moves. The current behavior indicates both are trying to project strength without triggering uncontrolled escalation.
This pattern fits with past India-Pakistan conflicts. In 2019, after a deadly suicide bombing in Pulwama, India carried out airstrikes in Balakot (inside Pakistan) but stopped short of a ground assault. Pakistan responded with its own air strikes, and while both sides traded fire, they deliberately avoided expanding the conflict. Even during the Kargil War in 1999, the fighting was confined to a specific region along the Line of Control, and neither side invaded deeper into the other’s territory. Globally, countries that do intend to escalate, like Russia before its 2022 invasion of Ukraine or Germany before WWII, often use aggressive rhetoric or stage massive buildups with little effort to hide their intentions. In contrast, both India and Pakistan are publicly stating they do not want war, which, in diplomacy, is usually a real signal of restraint. Taken together, their cautious military actions and calming public messages suggest this crisis, while serious, is still being managed to avoid all-out war.
The Indian’s threat on water will probably not follow through
India has recently threatened to cut off water access to Pakistan by utilizing its control over the eastern tributaries of the Indus River system, specifically the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej rivers. This move would represent a significant escalation, as the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960, governs the shared use of the river system, with India responsible for the eastern rivers and Pakistan for the western ones. For Pakistan, the Indus River is vital for its agriculture, providing around 90% of the country’s irrigation water. Cutting off or diverting this water would have devastating economic and social consequences, threatening Pakistan’s food security and political stability. While India has used the threat of water disruption as leverage in past conflicts, historical patterns suggest it is unlikely to follow through with such extreme measures. The Indus Waters Treaty has long acted as a stabilizing force, and India’s previous actions, such as limited strikes and covert operations rather than full-scale warfare, show a tendency to avoid actions that could escalate uncontrollably. Disrupting water access could provoke not only severe international backlash but also destabilize the entire region, something India has historically sought to avoid. Therefore, despite the rhetoric, it is more likely that India will pursue diplomatic or limited military options instead of taking the drastic step of cutting Pakistan’s water supply.
A rhetorical battle for their domestic audiences
In the coming weeks, we can expect both India and Pakistan to engage in increasingly assertive and nationalistic rhetoric. From India’s perspective, the main points of focus will likely include framing its actions as defensive in response to Pakistan’s support of cross-border terrorism and the need to protect national security. India will emphasize its right to sovereignty, particularly regarding the Kashmir issue, and may highlight its growing military strength as evidence of its capacity to confront any threats. The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty will be presented as a necessary measure in response to Pakistan’s alleged provocative actions, and India is likely to position itself as willing to engage diplomatically, but only if Pakistan addresses its role in supporting militants. Expect strong appeals to domestic nationalism, with India portraying itself as a global power unwilling to tolerate external aggression.
On the other hand, Pakistan will frame its rhetoric around self-defense and the preservation of its sovereignty. It will likely accuse India of violating the Indus Waters Treaty and international law, positioning India’s actions as a provocative and destabilizing move that threatens the livelihoods and security of millions of Pakistanis. The water issue will be central to Pakistan’s arguments, with appeals to the humanitarian impact of any disruptions to the Indus River’s water supply, which is critical to Pakistan’s agricultural base. Pakistan will also emphasize the need for peace, presenting itself as willing to engage in dialogue while asserting its right to resist Indian actions. In terms of global alliances, Pakistan will likely appeal to Islamic solidarity and seek international mediation to highlight its plight, portraying itself as the aggrieved party in a struggle for justice and survival. Both countries will likely invoke nuclear deterrence in their rhetoric, signaling their ability to escalate matters but stopping short of full-scale war, as neither side truly wants to provoke such a scenario.
Conclusion
While the situation remains highly volatile, the most probable outcomes seem to point toward limited military engagement and diplomatic negotiations rather than all-out war. Both countries have strong incentives to avoid a full-scale conflict, especially given the nuclear deterrent and the global consequences of escalating hostilities. The water issue is significant but will likely remain a tool of diplomatic pressure, rather than leading to full-blown military action. Ultimately, international mediation and strategic restraint will play key roles in preventing this conflict from spiraling out of control.