Why Do We Need Land Mines, and How to Use Them Ethically

Anti-personnel (AP) mines in the 21st century. Isn’t it backward and cruel?

Let’s first address the elephant in the room: all the reasons why misuse of AP landmines has given them a dirty reputation.

Why land mines have a bad reputation?

• They cause civilian casualties long after conflicts end.
• They violate international humanitarian law principles.
• They hinder post-war recovery and development.
• They block access to land and resources for survivors.
• They cause life-long injuries and disabilities.
• They impose high costs for removal and rehabilitation.
• They disproportionately affect children and vulnerable groups.
• They spread fear, trauma, and disrupt communities.
• They damage the international reputation of user states.

All these points result exclusively from irresponsible use of mines. Responsible use focuses on three core principles:

1. Exclusively in DMZs. Mines should only be used at the borders of hostile nations, specifically in de-militarized zones (DMZs), where nobody is supposed to go ever regardless of war or peace. That single rule alone avoids all civilian casualties, post-war recovery problems, and loss of access to farmland. South Korea has done well by sticking to that rule, remaining protected from North Korea for decades with no negative consequences.
2. Mapped and Fenced. We should precisely map where each mine is buried (mapping to centimeter precision is now possible) so they can be dug up when due for replacement, or removed if a neighbor permanently stops being hostile. Even the Nazis during World War II did this, despite being absolute monsters. The mined areas should be tightly fenced with plenty of signs so neither enemies nor friends enter by mistake.
3. Self-deactivating. A modern mine can include a timer to deactivate after a few years, and some models are largely biodegradable. This prevents lost mines from becoming hazards, and it also creates an incentive to map them correctly for future replacement.

By sticking to these three rules, every single negative aspect is eliminated.

But making something harmless does not make it useful.

So why do we really need AP mines in the first place?

Simply put: because of Russia and their strategy.

Russia specializes in large assaults using many poorly equipped and poorly trained soldiers, also called “meat waves,” with complete disregard for human life.

The problem is that when they get through, they systematically torture, rape, and kill innocent people on a large scale, as shown in Bucha and many other occupied areas in Ukraine. These are not isolated events. The UN has over 150,000 documented cases of Russian war crimes, more than all other wars combined in Europe since World War II. This is a widespread problem. Every patch of land occupied by Russia results in tremendous innocent suffering. The human cost is extreme, rivaled in scale only by the Nazi regime. We have the absolute moral duty to use every defense at our disposal against such levels of barbarity.

So, how can we defend ourselves against Russia?

First, let’s talk about NATO Article 5, which serves as a deterrent, and obviously only for member countries. But considering that Trump has openly questioned whether he would honor this defense, even saying that “Putin can do whatever he wants to eastern European countries,” and noting that Western European armies are high-tech but tiny in numbers, the practical effectiveness of NATO is close to using your everyday shirt as protection against bullets. Not very effective, and less and less of a deterrent for an enemy with little to lose. UK and France are not going to risk London and Paris in a nuclear exchange with Moscow to save Tallinn. Thinking otherwise is plain delusion.

How about hard power therefore?

Artillery barrages work fine to stop Russian meat waves, but at €8,000 per 155mm shell, it costs about a million euros for a 2-min barrage on a single square kilometer. AP mines can permanently cover the same area for the same price, with a mine every 2.5 meters. They can be laid with machines or drones in a couple of days and require no further work for the next four years or more. If you want to cover the 1,000 kilometers of front line with Russia in Ukraine or Finland, artillery would cost a million billion euros for four years of continuous fire, compared to a single billion with mines. This is exactly one million times cheaper. Even if money were no problem, we simply do not have a “million billion,” as that represents five times the planet’s GDP and global wealth combined. I would also question the ethical argument that dying from an artillery shell is so much more humane than from an AP mine.

In practice, AP mines are a million times cheaper than artillery to defend a frontline with a similar effect. This is vital in asymmetric warfare, as for Estonia against a much larger opponent like Russia. Of course, mines do not replace artillery for all uses, but for static land defense, mines are far more efficient.

What about human-controlled remote devices like Claymore mines? The idea is attractive: to control precisely what explodes, when, and in what conditions, with a (hopefully wise) human in the loop. But that doesn’t work very well if the operator is more than 100 meters away, or it costs a lot more with video systems. It is completely impractical during mass assaults over large areas. Claymores are fantastic ambush tools in forests and were invented for the Vietnam war. However, all forests are quickly reduced to a lunar landscape in an artillery war like the one Russia wages in Europe, making ambushes a thing of the past.

Not to mention, Claymore-like weapons require several operators per square kilometer, in constant duty around the clock. I would much prefer my countrymen working in startups, developing a healthy future, rather than watching empty fields non-stop for decades of cold war, not producing anything that builds our future. Let the enemy bankrupt itself with its manned solutions over the long term. That is part of why the USSR lost the cold war to the US.

Then, speaking of high tech, what about drones and missiles?

Missiles cost about a million euros per shot and rarely kill more than twenty enemies at once. Missiles are important tools designed to destroy high-value targets such as enemy HQs, factories, tanks, and planes, but they are extremely inefficient to neutralize 500,000 soldiers. In summary, missiles cost one hundred times more than mines for a similar effect.

Medium-sized drones like Shaheds are a little more cost efficient, but despite their lower cost (around €30,000 each), they do not kill many on average, and many are intercepted since they are big and slow.

That leaves us with FPV drones. They come close to AP mines’ efficiency, despite having 75 percent of drones missing their target and the rest generally neutralizing one invader each. So, to stop 500,000 invaders, you need two million drones at €500 each, or one billion euros. This also requires 15,000 FPV drone pilots, which is more than the entire Estonian army. Training a pilot is not only costly and time-consuming, but also requires physical and mental aptitude. Not everyone can do it, just like not everyone can become an aircraft pilot or a surgeon.

In Estonia’s case, with a border with Russia only 294 kilometers long, AP mines would still be three times cheaper than FPV drones. Mines depend on how much ground you have, while FPVs depend on how many targets you have. Choke points like in Estonia favor mines. FPVs are useful tools, but better for other purposes, like when the enemy is hiding or moving. Once again, AP mines remain one of the best tools for permanent, static land defense, as an instrument of peace to protect innocent countries.

What about soldiers, tanks, and other old-school army equipment?

In a word: life. Are you comfortable sending your family members to die to avoid spending about €300 per soldier saved behind mined DMZs? The enemy may not be willing to pay that price for their own, but we are. We value life. That is one thing that differentiates us from the enemy.

In conclusion, land mines are critical tool to defend innocents.

When you combine ethical use of AP mines, a need to protect against barbaric actors like Russia, and the lack of practical alternatives, AP mines become a vital for Russia’s neighboring countries.

Of course, AP mines are not designed to be used alone, or as a replacement for anything else. They are a crucial component alongside all the other tools, just as a hammer does not replace a screwdriver. A good DMZ has a large band filled with mines and full of sensors to detect any presence, dragon teeths to slow tanks, several layers of barbwire to slow soldiers, trenches, bunkers and miradors to demultiply the effectiveness of a small defending army, artillery and missiles behind to support the front line, and, last but not least, a highly integrated air defense with planes, radars and electronic warfare to control the sky.

There is a reason why the US and, more recently, Finland, Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic countries have opted out of the Ottawa Convention banning AP mines. This reason is not stupidity, but pragmatism.

We need land mines as a defense against Russia, and we need to use them responsibly. They are one vital component of a responsible defense.